Yemen’s Political Labyrinth: A Journey through History

 

PALACE OF CHECKMATES

MIDDLE EASTERN MENACE

Yemen in Historical Context: Kingdoms, Colonialism, and Revolution

Yemen's political history is layered with the imprints of ancient civilizations, colonial interference, tribal allegiance, and ideological contestations. Once home to powerful kingdoms like Saba and Himyar, Yemen’s political story took a modern turn during the 20th century.

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire post-World War I, the northern part of Yemen (North Yemen) emerged as the Mutawakkilite Kingdom under Imam Yahya, a theocratic monarchy rooted in Zaydi Shia Islam. The south, meanwhile, fell under British influence, leading to the establishment of the British colony of Aden.

The historical divide between the tribal highlands of the north and the coastal, urbanized south laid the foundation for Yemen’s complex political bifurcation. This duality was later crystallized during the Cold War, with North Yemen adopting a republican system in 1962, following a revolution that deposed the Imamate, and South Yemen becoming the Marxist People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in 1967.

The Unification Mirage: A Marriage of Contradictions

At first, the 1990 unification of North and South Yemen appeared to be a hopeful step toward political coherence and national strength. Spearheaded by President Ali Abdullah Saleh of North Yemen and Ali Salim al-Beidh from the South, the merger was meant to consolidate resources, diminish external influence, and form a multi-party republic.

However, the ideological disparity between the north’s tribal-armed conservatism and the south’s Marxist secularism became increasingly evident. Within four years, discontent led to a civil war in 1994, during which northern forces defeated the southern secessionist attempt. Saleh emerged as a dominant force, gradually centralizing power and marginalizing southern leaders—a move that created a festering grievance still present today.

Party Politics: Power, Patronage, and Polarization

Yemen’s party system, though theoretically multi-party, has functioned more like a factional battlefield. The General People's Congress (GPC), led by Ali Abdullah Saleh for over three decades, monopolized power through patronage networks, tribal alliances, and state control over resources.

The Islamic party Islah (al-Tajammu al-Yamani li al-Islah), founded in 1990, became the most influential opposition. Rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi thought, Islah walked a tightrope between religious populism and pragmatic politics. Initially allied with Saleh, it later opposed his regime, especially during the 2011 Arab Spring protests.

The Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), once the ruling party of the south, failed to reclaim its past stature post-unification, weakened by internal splits and systemic exclusion. Meanwhile, the Houthis, emerging as a Zaydi revivalist movement, began as a cultural response to marginalization in the north but gradually militarized into a formidable political-religious force.

Yemen’s party politics illustrate Giovanni Sartori’s concept of "polarized pluralism," where ideologically distant parties and fragile institutions prevent stable coalition building. Rather than liberal pluralism, Yemen veered into what Juan Linz called a “disloyal opposition” scenario, where parties viewed each other as existential threats.

The Arab Spring and the Fall of a Strongman

The Arab Spring in 2011 marked a pivotal rupture. Mass protests against Saleh’s autocratic regime echoed through Sana’a and Taiz. The protesters—comprised of youth, liberals, Islamists, and tribes—demanded dignity, jobs, and democracy. Saleh’s survival instinct led him to play off competing factions until a failed assassination attempt pushed him to resign under a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative in 2012, handing power to his deputy, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi.

The National Dialogue Conference (NDC), launched in 2013, aimed to bring together diverse factions, including women and youth, in an inclusive peace-building effort. Though lauded internationally, the NDC failed to deliver tangible reforms, largely due to elite domination, a weak state apparatus, and unresolved questions of federalism and southern autonomy.

Yemen’s experience during this period aligns with Samuel Huntington’s “political decay” theory: when institutional modernization lags behind social mobilization, instability follows. The failure to transform revolutionary energy into institutional consolidation allowed old and new power centers—like the Houthis and Saleh loyalists—to reassert themselves violently.

Civil War and the Proxy Chessboard

By 2014, the fragile transition collapsed. The Houthis, capitalizing on northern grievances and aligning with Saleh, took over Sana’a. President Hadi fled to Aden and then to Riyadh. This marked the start of a devastating civil war, compounded by foreign interference.

In 2015, a Saudi-led coalition, backed by the U.S., U.K., and UAE, launched Operation Decisive Storm to reinstate Hadi and counter what they viewed as Iranian expansionism through the Houthis. Yemen turned into a proxy battlefield of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, echoing realist theories of international relations, particularly Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism, which emphasizes the anarchic nature of international politics and state pursuit of power.

Domestically, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) emerged, pushing for southern secession. Meanwhile, AQAP (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) and ISIS took advantage of the chaos. Yemen’s internal fragmentation turned the civil war into a multi-layered conflict—tribal, sectarian, regional, and ideological.

A Frail Transition and the Road Ahead

As of 2024, Yemen remains in a fragile transition. The UN-mediated truce of 2022 provided temporary respite but failed to produce lasting peace. The Presidential Leadership Council, formed in April 2022, represents a spectrum of anti-Houthi groups yet remains riven by internal competition.

While some progress has been made in local ceasefires and humanitarian aid access, a broader political settlement remains elusive. The fragmentation of national identity, absence of a functioning state, and lack of grassroots political participation hinder peace efforts. Women and youth—once visible during the Arab Spring—are now largely excluded from formal politics.

Still, Yemen’s civil society, journalists, and local negotiators offer a glimmer of hope. Their efforts underline Hannah Arendt’s belief in the power of collective action and plurality as foundational to political life.

Conclusion: The Political Soul of Yemen

Yemen’s political history is not just a tale of wars and power struggles—it is also about resilience, identity, and contested visions of the state. From theocratic imamate to republican experiment, from unification dreams to civil war nightmares, Yemen has traversed the full arc of political transitions.

The current phase—though bleak—offers an opportunity to reflect on what kind of state Yemenis want. Can a decentralized federal model accommodate the country's deep-rooted localism and tribalism? Can political institutions evolve to reflect the pluralism of Yemeni society?

As political theorists like Charles Tilly argue, “War makes states”. Yemen’s journey, however, complicates this axiom. War here has eroded the state, not built it. The future of Yemen lies not in further militarization but in reconstructing the social contract—slowly, painfully, and inclusively.

Sources:

(text)

1.  Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis by Sarah Phillips

2. Historical Dictionary of Yemen by Robert D. Burrowes

3. "Yemen: Is Peace Possible?" by International Crisis Group

(pictures)

PIC-1: Wikipedia

PIC-2: The New Arab

PIC-3: Wikipedia

PIC-4: Wikipedia

PIC-5: Wikipedia

PIC-6: Al Jazeera

PIC-7: BBC

PIC-8: European Council on Foreign Relations

PIC-9: GAO